By Chris Hattingh
May is election month in South Africa. Given the ongoing high-unemployment, low-growth malaise afflicting the country (resulting largely from the current governing party’s ideological and policy choices), the consensus is that the ANC’s support will decline from previous cycles – possibly below 50%. Whether voters will move to parties such as the DA, EFF, and others en masse remains to be seen. Indeed, the rising trend of voters staying away from the polls might increase, or at least remain at the same high level as the previous elections.
A new survey conducted by Ipsos, released on 26 April, states that the governing African National Congress (ANC) is ‘struggling to impress voters.’ 2 545 registered voters were surveyed; the survey took place from March 9 to April 15, across all provinces, was conducted in the homes and home languages of those surveyed. Of those surveyed, 38% are of the view that the ANC will live up to its election promises. Only 23% feel that the country is moving in the right direction.
As to party support, the ANC polled at 40.2%. The Democratic Alliance delivers 21.9%. The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) sits at 11.5%. The newly formed uMkhonto weSizwe (MK) Party (polled for the first time here in an Ipsos survey) comes in fourth with 8.4%, more than the Inkatha Freedom Party (4.4%), ActionSA (3.4%), and the Freedom Front Plus (1.8%). MK’s emergence appears to be hurting the EFF the most, ‘particularly in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN).’
MK is the card in the deck with the most disruptive potential, especially in KZN. The ANC, EFF, and IFP appear to be those who will be most hurt by MK, but its impact doesn’t appear to be as nationwide as initially thought.
MK party spokesperson Nhlamulo Ndhlela indicated Jabulani Khumalo (who registered the party) and four others had been axed for ‘attempting to destabilise the party.’ Internal ructions and tensions, especially given the makeup of most of its leadership and the character of its most famous supporter and image-generator (former president Jacob Zuma). Should it emerge as the country’s fourth largest party (and possibly one of the largest in KZN) those tensions could come into sharper relief. Longevity is not guaranteed, neither for the party itself nor for any potential coalitions of which it may be a part.
KZN and Gauteng look set to be the most hotly contested provinces. Should these be governed by some make-up of opposition coalition, the three most economically important provinces (GP, KZN, along with the Western Cape) will be lost to the ANC.
At the time of writing the DA will likely maintain its majority in the WC, but its support is being slightly chipped away at by the Patriotic Alliance.
Should the ANC drop below 50%, a new era of national coalition politics will be upon the country. This could mean more uncertainty around power-sharing and policies, with gridlock and stalled progress around structural reforms. But there will also be new opportunities for change on a provincial and municipal level, with those provinces and cities with better management, planning, and transparency setting themselves up well over the next five to ten years.
In April South Africa celebrated 30 years of democracy. The next year (never mind the next 30) looks set to be one of increased change, in both positive and negative (and expected and unexpected) ways. Business, community organisations, religious institutions, and others can fill those gaps that are to come in a positive manner; if not, destructive actors such as mafias and populist politicians will attempt to take advantage, ultimately only for their own benefit.
